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 Abstract 
Iran, a country generally seen as abusing the laws of human rights in favour of 
the Islamic laws and where women is being punished if not wearing headscarves 
in public. However, the great opposition against this country’s laws is probably 
not aware of the revolution in 1979 that formed the contemporary society of Iran. 
This study brings light to a revolution rarely mentioned nowadays. It analyzes the 
reasons possible for the making of the revolution and draws the conclusion that it 
was not because religion being put aside that made the revolution happen. 
With the concept of contentious politics is then the actual mobilization process 
analyzed to answer how such a broad mass of Iranians could support a revolution 
that had the rallying cry to, in a modern western view close the society and isolate 
it to the surrounding world. 
Through speeches and texts published by the front man of the revolution 
Ayatollah Khomeini has the mobilization been analyzed and concludes that the 
use of Marxist rhetoric and Islamic symbolism, especially the Shiite tradition of 
martyrdom attracted the people who risked their lives by protesting in the streets 
that eventually made the dictatorial Shah leave Iran in favour for the country’s 
new supreme leader; Ayatollah Khomeini. 
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 1 Introduction 
On the first of February 1979 Ruhollah Khomeini triumphantly arrived to the 
country he had been departed from fifteen years earlier. The arrival is seen as the 
ending of the dictatorial leadership of the Shah and the beginning of the Islamic 
Republic. The people had fought against the Shah’s tyrannical leadership for 
several years but it was not until the Shiite cleric Ayatollah Khomeini began 
advocate an uprising that the people began risking their lives by protesting in the 
streets which subsequently, after a lot of bloodshed made the Shah go for a brief 
“vacation” where he never came back from. This revolution is interesting because 
it had such a great support among the people (Skocpol 1994: 266) and because of 
its difference from other revolutions. The big difference is that it was not a 
socialistic revolution, it was an Islamic revolution. Or was it? The rhetoric used 
by Ayatollah Khomeini is comparable to the leaders of socialistic revolutions such 
as the reference to the people as the oppressed (mostazafin) and the enemy the 
oppressors (mostakberin) (Abrahamian 1993: 26). It is though unquestionable that 
the big winners of the revolution were the clerics because they gained a lot of the 
political power especially Ayatollah Khomeini. He has been seen as the leader of 
the revolution and became Iran’s supreme leader after the revolution. The 
following chapters will analyze why this revolution could happen in the first 
place, and how the people got indoctrinated by the cleric and Khomeini to make a 
revolution in the name of Islam. 
1.1 Statement of Purpose and Problem 
Iran was considered as one of the wealthiest countries in the Middle East during 
the 60s and 70s. The country’s great oil resources attracted oil companies all over 
the world that wanted to establish refineries and have a piece of this black gold. 
The Shah of Iran, who admired the western lifestyle, welcomed the companies 
with open arms. Everything was in order but suddenly mass protests began 
escalating on the streets and created a chaos that eventually made the Shah flee 
the country and a new leader was installed; Ayatollah Khomeini. How did this 
happen? My purpose of this study is to locate and analyze the underlying reasons 
of what made the people protest in the streets and risking their lives. This country 
that on the surface was in perfect condition according to our western belief had a 
different reality the people were fed up with. The purpose is also to wake an 
opinion still in belief of that this shift of power was just some ordinary coup d'état. 
It was not an ordinary coup d'état, it was a mass based revolt against the Shah. 
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 The research question I am supposed to answer with this study is two-parted 
where I suggest that you need an answer to the first question if being able to 
answer the second. The questions of my thesis are:  
 
(1) “Why did the revolution in Iran occur?”  
(2) “How did Ayatollah Khomeini mobilize the people to eventually do a 
revolution?” 
 
These questions are to be answered with this study and the following sections 
will in detail present method, material and what theories that has been used to 
answer the questions.  
1.2 Method 
This chapter will outline what method I have used for my study and an 
explanation to why this method was preferable than others. 
My research problem is divided into two parts. To approach the understanding 
to what the underlying reasons for the Iranian revolution were I used a theory 
consuming method were I focus on the actual case. This method uses already 
existing theories to try to explain what happened in the studied case (Esaiasson et 
al 2007: 42). Since my purpose with this research is to understand what the 
reasons were for one specific revolution I found this method better than a theory 
testing method which is more preferable when approaching a case or cases on a 
more abstract level (Ibid: 43). I am aware of that my choice of method limits the 
possibilities of making general assumptions of revolutions, but since all 
revolutions are all of unique design (Skocpol 1994:7), there are troubles 
generalizing revolutions at all. The second part of my research problem of how 
Khomeini mobilized the people to an eventual revolution is of a slightly similar 
design. To help me understand what made the people turn to Khomeini, I used 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s theory concerning contentious politics which is 
described in an upcoming chapter. I linked the theory to events at the advent of 
the revolution in 1979 to try to realize how people from different backgrounds 
could unite to overthrow the Shah. I have based my material to the second section 
of the study from mainly texts and speeches from Khomeini to find out what 
things that were said or done that could attract such broad support.  
1.3 Material Discussion 
This section will bring light to the importance of evaluation of sources when 
dealing with studies of this kind and a discussion of the choice of material.  
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 The Iranian revolution of 1979 has been studied frequently by scholars all 
over the world. A majority of these scholars have some relations to the country 
such as family-ties or other connections. In the introduction to the book Islamic 
Iran (1985), Asaf Hussain described how you could divide the authors about the 
Iranian revolution in different categories depending on their relation to the 
revolution (Hussain 1985: 3). Authors with any connection to Iran autonomously 
have some general opinion about the revolution since it is such a major event in 
the country’s history. Their opinions are implicitly or explicitly outspoken in their 
books which put me in a position where I always needed to be alert of the 
possibility of wrong or misguided information because of the author’s personal 
relations to the cause. This could rather provide as evidence for the hermeneutic 
statement that there is no such thing as an objective fact and that social sciences 
should not always have that as an aim (Lundquist 1993: 42). Wherever you turn 
and whatever you are doing research about, someone who has stated a fact has an 
direct or indirect opinion to it which is bound to be expressed the minute he or she 
pronounces it or puts his fingers on the keyboard of the computer and writes it or 
such and for that reason knowledge is a subjective matter and science should not 
always have an aim at stating the truth. Though I think the truth is in the eye of 
the beholder, a scholar should make a great effort to try to be as objective as 
possible and follow the rules provided to make an objective research. I am 
concerned of this and hence my study is not claiming a universal truth it seeks to 
understand the case of Iran with help of general theories. 
The texts and speeches I have analyzed are simply a small part of what has 
been published by Khomeini but I have more or less limited my empirical data to 
texts and speeches concerning the advent of the revolution. All of the texts and 
speeches I have used are translated from Farsi1 into English. I have had a reserved 
stance to these sources because of the possibility of translation errors and the 
translator revising the texts. I am aware of the subsequent lacking of validity of 
the study and that the optimal option would have been to read and analyze the 
texts and speeches in its original language but adversities such as language 
difficulties and logistical reasons have limited me to secondary sources. As for the 
first research question of what the underlying reasons of the Iranian revolution 
were, is secondary material used from several sources including scholars being 
supportive of the Shah’s leadership and against his leadership. This mix of pros 
and cons do I think is useful because it gives me a chance to check information 
from sources of different opinion of the revolution before I states it in my thesis, 
which I think increases the validity of the study. 
1.4 Theory 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 The Iranian language 
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 In order to answer the questions of my study, Theda Skocpol and Jack 
Goldstone’s theories concerning revolutions and reasons to their arising and 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrows theory of contentious politics have been used as 
a framework. These theories will be presented in detail together with a discussion 
concerning the reasons and relevance of usage in the text below. 
1.4.1 Reasons of Revolutions 
For answering the question of why the revolution in Iran happened, theories of 
Theda Skocpol and Jack Goldstone have been used to help understand the 
outbreak of the revolution in Iran. They both provide facts from countries who 
have been subjects of revolutions of some kind and among other things tries to 
analyze the underlying reasons of their outbreaks. Skocpol assumes with reference 
to empirical evidence that an authoritarian leadership makes a state more prone to 
a revolution (Skocpol 1994: 265f) Goldstone who has studied earlier revolutions 
draws the attention to that revolutions occurs more often in states who suffers 
great population increases which in turn often leads to urban migration and rural 
misery (Goldstone 1991: 25). These two scholars are supposed to provide me with 
a framework needed to answer the question of why the revolution in Iran 
occurred. I am aware of other possible theories concerning reasons of why 
revolutions happen but I think these theories could well fit my case. 
1.4.2 Contentious Politics 
The concept of contentious politics covers an extensive spectrum in the discipline 
of political contention from its causes and processes to outcomes. The concept is 
summarized by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007: 4) as follows: 
 
 “Contentious politics involves interactions in which actors make claims bearing on 
someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or 
programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. 
Contention politics thus brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, 
collective action and politics.”  
 
These three different features are most likely applicable to political processes 
where an actor A claims anything from actor C with help of the actor B. The 
criteria of the process or the event to fall in the concept of contentious politics, is 
that a government plays the role as either actor A, B or C. As previous mentioned, 
Tilly and Tarrow embrace an extensive spectrum of contention which ranges from 
the acting of small-scale lobbying groups to the events of civil wars and 
revolutions. Any of these events includes the processes of contention, collective 
action and politics. I will highlight the contention in the case of the Iranian 
revolution since it refers to the process of the actor, which in my case are the 
clergy and Ayatollah Khomeini, making claims in form of direct attacks on the 
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 Shah’s regime including demands of his resignation (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 4ff). 
This process is important to underline when moving to the next part of the 
contentious politics; collective action. This part, as its name concludes, relates to 
the collective action where the actor A has mobilized the actors B and instructed 
them to react in a manner to collect the claims the entire process began with (Tilly 
& Tarrow: 5). Tilly and Tarrow concludes the concept of mobilization as “how 
people who at a given point in time are not making contentious claims start to do 
so” (Ibid: 35). The contentious claims could well be a call of a revolution. The 
mobilizing process includes the mechanisms of creating a collective identity of 
the group with forming boundaries and pinpointing its enemies (Ibid: 34). The 
concept of contentious politics is very wide and much of its contents do not 
contribute to my research problem. Therefore is the study limited to focus on 
mainly the mobilization processes where I think this theory would be very helpful 
to understand how Khomeini succeeded to mobilize the people of Iran. 
The main reason for choosing this theory is because the concepts presented are 
rather applicable to my case, which therefore contributes to answer the question 
stated. 
The critique of the theory could probably be its great generalizations of the 
cases used. It is apparent when making a distinction of countries as either 
democratic or undemocratic (Ibid: 55). The decision of stating a country as 
democratic or not is vague and relative to its compared part and should perhaps 
not be measured in such a polarizing manner. Though I am aware of when 
presenting such a broad and widespread theory you need to generalize to make it 
easier to apply it on empirical data. 
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 2 Reasons of the Revolution 
 The first question of my study was to find the reasons of the revolution in Iran. A 
great opinion has since the occurrence of the revolution had a belief that it was a 
basic coup d’état that surprised politicians and political scientists all over the 
world (Thomas 2005:1 & Skocpol 1982: 265). This was a mass-based revolution 
(Ibid: 266) but what did the people fought for? Was it against religious 
inequalities in the country like many people are in the opinion of or could you 
trace other inequalities or matters that could produce a frustration of the people 
that finally made a revolution happen? To enlighten why this certain revolution 
did occur, I have used theories presented by Theda Skocpol and Jack Goldstone. 
With their help have Iran been studied through three dimensions where I mean 
that you would find clear segments and events that create a more structural 
understanding of why the revolution occurred instead of assuming it based on 
religious inequalities. The three dimensions I have studied Iran from are the 
political, economical and the cultural dimension that is supposed to bring a more 
holistic light to the situation in Iran at the advent of the revolution.  
2.1 Political Situation 
In this section I will describe the political situation Iran before the revolution and 
then highlight on political actions and events made by the Shah2 which likely 
could have rooted a great frustration of the people. My purpose is to link the 
events and actions of the political regime in Iran to what you call an authoritarian 
regime which according to Skocpol makes countries more susceptible to a 
revolution (Skocpol 1994: 19).  
Iran have a long history of its leaders coming from different dynasties from 
the Safavid dynasty beginning in 1501 (McDaniel 1991: 17) to the latest Pahlavi 
dynasty which came to an abrupt end in 1979. The Pahlavi dynasty began its reign 
during 1920 when Reza Khan, a military officer in a Persian Cossack brigade rose 
to power after a coup d’état. He seized politic control over Iran and added the title 
Shah3 to his name which is the ancient Persian word for king. He gave himself 
absolute power and established the Pahlavi dynasty, which appealed to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Muhammed Reza, the second Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty is referred to as the Shah in this study. The first Shah 
is referred to as Reza Shah or Reza Khan.  
3 The actual title was Shahanshah (Pahlavi 1961: 2) which means king of kings, but is in western texts shortened 
to simply Shah. 
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 Iranians since they have a tradition of powerful single-handed rulers (Saikal 1980: 
21). He was a nationalist with pro-western ideas and had visions of creating an 
Iran similar to the Turkey Kemal Ataturk had created. Reza Shah established good 
relations to countries such as Britain, Russia, France and Germany. The relation to 
the latter country would later become the fall of his reign. When the World War II 
broke out, Britain and Soviet occupied Iran because of their connections with 
Germany, despite Iran’s proclamation as neutral in the war. This consequently 
made Reza Shah abdicate in favour of his son Mohammed Reza. In the coming 
years, Iran suffered from political imbalance including the forced rout of 
Mohammed Reza in 1953, the CIA-supported operation three days later of 
overthrowing the Prime Minister Muhammed Mossadeq and the re-appointment 
of Mohammed Reza to power (Saikal 1980: 44 & 214-5, Bakhash 1984: 10 & 
Naraghi 1994: 182). 
 The parliament of Iran (Majlis) had limited power before the Shah was 
appointed to power, and was weakened even more after the crowning of the Shah. 
In 1950 he constitutionally legal established the Senate which concentrated the 
power of the Shah and also gave him the right to dissolve both the Senate and the 
parliament, which he in May 1960 did (Hussain: 40f). In 1975 he abandoned the 
two-party system of Iran he once set up in favour of a one-party system. The only 
party allowed was the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) which the Shah called the Iranians 
to join and support whether leftist or rightist. Those who opposed the party were 
asked to cease their activities or leave the country or face the penalties (Saikal: 
189). The Shah limited the parliamentary and democratically forum for critique 
against him by abolishing political parties and reducing the role of the parliament. 
 To prevent any critique being expressed by any individual the Shah found the 
national intelligence and security organization, SAVAK which was created to 
strengthen the Shahs power by keeping control over his opponents (Wright & 
Danziger 1989: 9). The whole organization had an estimated work-force of three 
million people operating both in the country and abroad (Hussain: 44). SAVAK 
arrested anyone who opposed the Shah and namely Marxists, political science 
students and mullahs and stands guilty for murdering and torturing over thousand 
people who opposed the Shah (Hussain: 44 & Time magazine 1979 - SAVAK). 
This Stasi-like organization was a significant instrument of oppression the Shah 
used against his people to wipe out any form of critique against him.  
Furthermore the Shah consolidated his power by appointing people to public 
offices based on personal loyalties to him which consequently made all the 
political relationships personal and all in all strengthen the Shah’s power even 
more (Hussain: 37). The handpicking of people to public office is one sign of a 
corrupt system Iran suffered from (Ibid: 37-40) which must have frustrated the 
educated in Iran since employment to office was not based on real proficiency but 
on personal loyalty to the Shah. 
When Skocpol states that third world countries with authoritarian regimes are 
more likely to generate a cross-class political support of revolutionary 
movements, Iran is not set aside (Skocpol 1994: 19 & 265ff). You could well 
identify the Shah’s leadership as an authoritarian regime, which I have tried to 
present in the text above. Cronyism and a more or less dictatorial leadership are 
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 not surprisingly to find in other states political system that has been exposed to 
revolutions or uprisings, using Honduras and Cuba as examples. I do not think 
that simply an authoritarian regime will create an uprising or revolution. It could 
well be it that the regime creates a frustration of the people, but as Skocpol also 
has stated, it is hard to generally make assumptions of revolutions since you need 
to study them from a historical context based framework (Skocpol 1994: 7). This 
is interesting in the case of Iran because they have not a characteristic history of 
parliamentary rule as we may find in countries in Europe, but rather the opposite 
with despotic rulers as role models for their political leaders. I am not suggesting 
that the authoritarian leadership of the Shah was appreciated by the Iranians since 
they have not had any democratic leader before, but I rather mean that you need to 
have their historical heritage in mind when trying to locate what reasons making 
Iran more prone to a revolution or you could lower the validity of the study. That 
is why I also present how the economic and the cultural situation in Iran were at 
the time of the revolution and not limit it to just explain the political situation and 
consequently getting a wider understanding why the revolution occurred. 
2.2 Economic Situation 
This section will focus on the economic situation in Iran before the revolution in 
hope to get a broader understanding of why a revolution occurred. I will 
emphasize on the Organization Plan which was a development plan to modernize 
and industrialize Iran, how Iran’s great oil resources and revenues were 
distributed and the so called White Revolution, a socioeconomic reform program 
that the Shah was hoping to change the Iranian society with which he 
consequently did but not in a manner beneficial for himself.  
The Shah along with his father had a vision of westernising and modernising 
Iran and since the Shah were in great debt to USA for getting him back in to 
power in 1953 he hired American planners to formulate a plan to modernize Iran  
which was called the Organization Plan (Hussain: 45). This plan was aiming to 
modernize almost every field of the Iranian economy including industry, health 
and education (Ibid). Many American companies settled down all over Iran during 
this period which made it hard for especially peasants to make their business go 
round since many of the American companies were agricultural corporations that 
the peasants could not stand a chance competing with. This created a migration of 
people to the bigger cities, namely Tehran that along with the Organization Plan 
establishing a great amount of new industries (ibid: 47). From 1956 to 1976 the 
population of Iran made an increase of 75 per cent, from just over twenty million 
to nearly thirty-five million (Goldstone 1991: 472). Large increase of population 
and urban migration is one of Jack Goldstone’s primary concerns of what could 
make a state more prone to an uprising or revolution. He draws attention to state 
breakdowns made from the sixteenth century to today and signifies that 
population growth often has led to expansion of armies and urban migration 
which makes states weaker since it creates higher state expenditures which often 
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 means higher taxes or other actions that could frustrate the people and easily 
create an opposition to the state (Goldstone: 24-38). Goldstone points out that a 
population increase itself should not be seen as an event creating an uprising. 
Though the frustration a population increase often brings could well trigger an 
event that causes an uprising or revolution (Ibid: 35f). In the case of Iran the 
Organization Plan which consequently created an urban migration, namely to 
Tehran could well have triggered a frustration of the people who eventually made 
the revolution. 
 As mentioned earlier, Iran’s great oil resources has made it very popular for 
big oil companies all over the world to get a share of it, and soon after the 
overthrow of Muhammed Mossadeq and the re-appointment of the Shah it was 
decided to split all the oil revenues in the country between the state owned 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and an international consortium of all 
major Western oil companies (Saikal: 48). The consortium had more capital and 
know-how than the NIOC and was therefore soon in full control of the Iranian oil 
industry and with its power to increase and decrease production and prices 
subsequently made the income grow steadily which affected Iran. The oil income 
grew from $ 22.5 million in 1954 to $ 285 million in 1960 (Ibid: 50f). However 
the increase of state income did not really affect the people of Iran because of the 
country’s high expenditure concerning the military and the urban migration. 
Marvin Zonis, a Professor from the University of Chicago was sent by the 
American government to Iran to give a report of the country. In Barry Rubin’s 
book Paved with Good intentions (1980: 143) Zonis concluded that:  
 
“One can visit the Hilton La Residence, The Key Club, the Bargaud, the 
Imperial Country Club or one of the staggeringly large number of boutiques 
in Tehran and not realise that he is in one of the poorest nations in the world” 
 
The people’s increased awareness of the state’s growth of income which had 
little or no effect on the people did create a frustration among the people. When 
the Shah felt this frustration growing and threatening his leadership he launched a 
reform program which he called the White Revolution (Enqelab-e Sefid). The 
name of the program was supposed to attract people either conservative or radical, 
since the word white referred to that the accomplishment was to be through no 
bloodshed or disorder and revolution because the program was supposed to bring 
innovative changes in the Iranian society (Saikal: 79f). The Shah’s vision was to 
reform the country in both political and economic manners. The political vision 
was to make Iran a “political democracy” which meant an implementation of a 
Western principle of parliamentary with the Persian monarchical tradition (Saikal: 
80). In practise this meant the two-party system presented in the political situation 
section that however got removed. An actual referendum whether or not to ratify 
the reform program was also held in which the Shah-supported yes-stance won by 
achieving 99.9 % of the votes (Bakhash: 27).  
The specific economy reforms included a full-scale land reform that 
redistributed land to 2.5 million families and later an industry reform that 
established new industries in the bigger cities (Saikal 84ff). 
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 The Shah gained support through the White Revolution from people who were 
against him before, and the effort to fight illiteracy in Iran was probably the 
Shah’s most successful reform (Saikal: 88). The land reform did not work out as it 
supposed to because of the government’s failure of placing a support system for 
the rural families which led to a massive migration to the bigger cities, 
particularly Tehran where the industry reform was at full speed and in need of 
employees (Britannica-Iran). This urban migration consequently led to higher 
prices and worse living conditions in the bigger cities (Hussain: 106f). 
The outcome of the White Revolution was not a success. Though the Shah 
gained support from parts of the people the failure of the land reform and the 
urban migration it created is seen as a setback because of the subsequent 
revolution a couple of years later.  
The urban migration as a consequence of the Organization Plan and the White 
Revolution created overcrowded cities which I think fit well with Goldstone’s 
assumptions of urban migration functioning as a trigger to an uprising or 
revolution. Though is it important not to draw any major assumption yet. In the 
next section I will present how the Shah’s actions affected the cultural life of the 
Iranians which is meant to give the reader another dimension to the question why 
the revolution occurred. 
2.3 Cultural Situation 
To understand how the opposition against the Shah grew steadily in periods of 
economic boost I think you need to look at the changes the Shah and his father 
tried to apply to change the Iranians way of manners and culture and locate 
actions that could have created or enhanced the opposition against the Shah. I 
have had a focus on the Shah’s vision of creating a modernized secular society 
with Western standards. Presenting this will probably get the reader another 
puzzle piece in the struggle to understand why the revolution occurred. 
The Shah’s father Reza Shah felt an attraction to the western way of life. He 
got his military training by Russians and had a good relation to the Brits who 
controlled some parts of Iran at the time of his rise to power. Through his relations 
with the Brits he got the first glimpse of the modernized Europeans. His vision 
was to introduce this way of life to the Iranians. As stated in the political situation 
section, Reza Shah tried to apply Kemal Ataturk’s model of how he secularized 
the Turkish society (McDaniel 1991: 28). Reza Shah’s son Muhammed Reza 
followed this vision and tried hard to achieve a modernized Iran. To make Iran a 
secular country, the Shah withdrew funding to the clerics in hope to seize their 
activities (Bakhash: 21). The clerics responded the opposite way. The Shah’s 
opposition against the clerics was not trying to distrust the religion itself since it 
would be a political suicide because of the large proportion of Muslims in the 
country. On the other hand the clerics had to watch their tongues because 
opposing the Shah could pay them a visit from SAVAK, which many though did 
and either became imprisoned or exiled including Ayatollah Khomeini. The Shah 
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 hoped to decrease the clerics status and increasing his own by claiming that he 
himself was a true Muslim and that God had given him the mission to lead Iran 
(Saikal: 71) which is quite ambivalent to his continuing focus of the importance of 
the monarchical leadership (Pahlavi 1961:47).  
The Shah strived to modernize Iran in several sectors of the society. His father 
Reza Shah had already begun modernizing Iran by building schools and cinemas 
but also introducing the western way of life and dress. Referring to the way of 
dress, Reza Shah made it illegal for women to appear in public with the chadour, a 
form of dress that covers the whole body in one large piece of cloth. According to 
Islam it is a sin for a lady to let her hair be seen by men except for those of her 
family (Salehi 1988: 86). The banning of the chadour symbolizes the strive, more 
or less by force4 to separate religion from the state and in this case also the streets 
since it limited the women to practice and express their religion in public. This 
blow against the clerics affected the relationship to Reza Shah negatively and it 
stayed relatively tense between them until and during the outbreak of the 
revolution. 
The introducing of a western lifestyle in Iran was opposed by the clergy who 
thought it extinguished Islam from the Iranian people (Khomeini and Algar 1981: 
27f) but also by leftist in Iran. They both saw the Shah’s leadership as a symbol of 
imperialism and a protector of a class society and therefore they refused to accept 
that any progressive step taken by the Shah would make any radical change in the 
society, because the Shah would never take any action against his own interests 
(Salehi: 103f). 
The western lifestyle boomed the Iranian society during Reza Shah’s period of 
reign and had a positive response to the people. If it really had that positive effect 
is questionable because Reza Shah more or less forced the ideal to the people. 
However the people began to question these ideals of the western lifestyle 
claiming that the adopting to a western lifestyle would lose the Iranians own 
cultural independence, originality and intellectual creativity (Salehi: 120). This 
subsequently created the concept of “mass culture” (Farhang e tudeh) which is 
seen as a reaction of the western culture and ideals influencing the Iranian culture. 
The “mass culture” was a counter example of the westernized way of life. It 
referred to a way of life untouched by western influence, where sympathy and 
devotion to the lower class was essential rather than the appreciation to monarchs 
and princes that the Shah preferred (Salehi: 121f). This reaction to the 
westernization of Iran together with the rather negative outcome of the Shah’s 
secularization, which all in all secularized the elite in Iran while the masses 
remained faithful to Islam (Hussain: 36) is a clear event that weakened the Shah’s 
rule and what the opposing groups focused on to eventually mobilize the people to 
make the revolution.    
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 If the police saw someone wearing a chadour in public they would be asked to pull it of their head and tear it up 
(Salehi: 86) 
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 2.4 Summary 
The Iranian revolution did not rise from nowhere. With my previous summary of 
the Shah’s leadership and the economic and cultural struggles in Iran during the 
advent of the revolution, I have hopefully broadened the understanding of why the 
revolution could occur. Together with the theories by Skocpol and Goldstone you 
get an even broader perspective of why the revolution happened in Iran. Skocpol 
highlights the despotic leadership which is apparent in Iran which gives proof of 
Iran being more prone to a revolution. Furthermore Goldstone points out that the 
urban migration and its negative consequences could trigger a revolution or an 
uprising which also is very significant in the case of Iran with its rapid 
industrialization and the subsequent overcrowding of namely Tehran. Goldstone 
never uses culture as it could in some way affect an uprising or such. This made it 
hard to attract his theory fully since I think that Iran and probably other states 
were revolutions have occurred, culture is an important segment to study. The 
implementing of the western ideal and lifestyle in Iran was popular from the 
beginning but experienced a huge backlash together with the growing economical 
inequalities and the Shah’s more despotic leadership. The people used the 
westernization of Iran as the reason for the economic inequalities and other 
grievances in the country. By blaming the implementing of western ideas and 
ideals they indirectly blamed the Shah’s White Revolution for westernizing Iran 
even more, which gave the reform program the opposite effect destined for. The 
backlash for the public opinion of the western culture in Iran do I think is very 
important to highlight when trying to understand what made the revolution 
happen in Iran. The clergy preached an opposite to the western ideals and focused 
on an Islamic Iranian culture instead of anything else, which attracted the people. 
Skocpol states the culture’s importance in the case of Iran but does not intensify 
this assumption which is rather unfortunate because I think it could well be an 
important factor in other revolutions as well. The most common examples of 
revolutions of our modern world are more or less made in the rubric of socialism 
with the Russian revolution of 1917 as a copybook display. The people were 
frustrated with the Tsar and his leadership including his modernizing ideas which 
also should be notified to the answering of the question of why that revolution 
could happen. The cultural understanding is hence important in that revolution 
together with other reasons too which I think should be put in focus even more, 
when finding out how a revolution could happen. 
The Iranian revolution was broadly based because of the big resistance to the 
Shah. The peasants were frustrated since there was a great focus on industrializing 
the country and the failure of the land reform. The lower and middle class were 
frustrated of not getting any significant piece of the outcome of Iran’s economical 
boost. The frustration by the lower and middle class grew even bigger when they 
experienced the great decrease of living standard in the cities as an outcome of the 
urban migration. The educated were frustrated because of the broad corruption, 
which made people suitable for certain jobs and positions step aside because of 
the Shah’s handpicking to these jobs. The clergy was also frustrated because the 
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 Shah forced a secular Iran by limiting the clergy’s channels for expressing 
themselves and cutting back on its funding. The Marxists were frustrated because 
of the Shah’s flirting with USA and other western countries and his back turning 
of Soviet and other communist countries. They opposed the implementing of the 
western ideals because they saw it as an imperialistic idea of USA trying to 
broaden their borders by colonizing Iran. With my text above I think I have 
highlighted events of the Shah’s leadership that not just frustrated one part of the 
society in Iran but a broad part of Iranian people irrespective of class. I hope this 
text have marked those with the opinion of that the revolution occurred because of 
religious inequalities in the country. What we can not leave aside is the fact that 
the Islamic clergy got the power after the overthrow of the Shah and in my next 
chapter I will try to find out how the clergy with Ayatollah Khomeini as the front-
man could mobilize the people and furthermore call the people to do a revolution.  
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 3 Mobilization 
The previous chapter is important to have concluded when moving on to this 
chapter. The previous chapter presented a view of Iran being susceptible to a mass 
based revolution because of grievances concerning the leadership, the 
economical- and cultural situation in the country at the time of the revolution. 
By rejecting the belief of the revolution being made because of religious 
inequalities you now understand that several other events and actions probably 
made the revolution happen. Turning to the revolutionary event itself, I am of the 
opinion that a revolution or an uprising does not just happen automatically. It 
needs something or someone to mobilize and trigger the people to take action. The 
case of Iran is rather fortunate since the “triggerer” and the leader of the 
revolution could well be summarized to Ayatollah Khomeini5. He was born in 
1902 in the city of Khomein in a family with great clerical traditions. Followed by 
extensive studying at the religious institutions in namely the city of Qom he 
received his religious title Ayatollah which is a title of a religious leader in the 
Shiite tradition in 1950s (Abrahamian: 5 & Britannica – Khomeini).  
The following chapter will try to answer how Khomeini succeeded to mobilize 
people from different class-backgrounds and unify them under a single banner. 
Together with Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s framework of contentious 
politics have texts, speeches and actions of Khomeini been analyzed to recognize 
the mobilization process of Iran. The texts and speeches presented are just a small 
selection of texts and speeches and are supposed to give the reader a clearer image 
of the mobilization process. The analysis of the mobilization process is presented 
in chronological order, first analyzing the events that made the clergy and 
Khomeini gain a broad support. Then analyzing the mechanisms used to unify the 
mass, including identification and border activation and lastly will the 
revolutionary outbreak be analyzed. 
3.1 Gaining Broad Support 
This section will analyze events and concerns that possibly could explain how 
Khomeini and the clergy gained such a broad support. Together with a linkage to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Ali Shariati is often mentioned in the literature as the person mobilizing the intelligentsia in Iran, since his 
interpretations of Islam was of a more symbolic manner which attracted the educated in Iran (Hussain: 66). 
However is my study based on the works of Khomeini since he mobilized a much broader mass and is therefore, 
in my opinion more interesting to study. 
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 the earlier chapter and the rhetoric of Khomeini’s earlier texts and speeches, will 
lead us to a possible answer of how Khomeini mobilized a broad mass. 
As brought up in the previous chapter, the authoritarian leadership of the Shah 
was frustrating the people of Iran. The industrialization processes that resulted in 
overcrowded cities and the implementation of western standards in the society are 
also a selection of grievances in Iran that proved that there was a broad resistance 
against the Shah and his regime. These grievances are all together labelled, by 
Tilly and Tarrow as repressions because they all are rooted as action or actions by 
an authority that increased the potential cost of an actor’s claim making (Tilly and 
Tarrow: 215). The claimants benefitting on the Shah’s repressions was Khomeini 
and the clergy. 
The clergy in Iran had a certain position in the society, since the long history 
of Islam in Iran. Though the Shah tried to lower their status by highlighting the 
monarchy’s even longer history of Iran, the status of the clergy always remained 
high. A good example of a group that claimed the resignation of the Shah but did 
not achieve the same support is the Marxists in Iran. They had an influence of the 
people of Iran because their theories, in many ways are comparable to Islam 
which most of the peoples of Iran were followers of (Hussain: 120). The Marxists 
did however not achieve a broad support in Iran. The answer is probably found 
along Ervand Abrahamians (1993) analyze of Khomeini and the clergy’s use of 
Marxist rhetoric. Khomeini used words most referred by Marxists such as the 
oppressed (mostazafin) and the oppressors (mostakberin) and stressing the clergy 
as against imperialism and other “isms” imported from the west (Abrahamian 
1993: 26 & Khomeini and Algar: 28f). The big difference between Khomeini and 
the Marxists was the usage of Islam and the religion as an important part of the 
grievance. Khomeini and the clergy had a rhetorical weapon the Marxists could 
not compete against; God. The using of popular rhetoric from Marxism together 
with the will of God was unbeatable in the competition of mobilizing the masses. 
A population which has had a history of hundred years of Islam makes sense to 
feel more connected to the religion than an ideology once stated religion as an 
opiate of the people. Furthermore is it needed to add that Marxism is more of a 
excluding kind than Islam since the Marxist theory is generally about class 
struggle where a bourgeoisie are excluded and considered as enemies. Islam, 
interpreted by Khomeini, on the other hand does not talk about certain classes and 
recognizes other religions as well (Khomeini and Algar: 27). These elements 
could well be parts of the explanation how the clergy and Khomeini gained such a 
big support and the Marxist did not. 
Khomeini used God as the highest authority and frequently told his audience 
that the claims made was the will of God:  
 
“By God, whoever does not cry out in protest is a sinner! By God, whoever does not express 
his outrage commits a major sin!” (Khomeini, October 27, 1964, cited in Khomeini and Algar 
1981: 185) 
 
God’s will is a powerful tool when mobilizing a broad mass since it is hard to 
question God’s authority. The preaching of God and Islam were more or less 
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 exclusionary held in the mosques’ in Iran, which during the advent of the 
revolution not only became a forum for preaching the Islamic belief. They also 
functioned as sanctuaries for the people as a place where they could express their 
frustration of the regime freely without the fear of presence from SAVAK 
(Hussain: 60-3). The Mosques’ function had the comparable function as the 
football stadium Camp Nou in Barcelona had for the Catalans during the Franco 
regime, when it was a place for the people to actually speak freely and use their 
native language which was illegal to speak in public (Xifra 2008: 194). 
Since the mosques had the function of a sanctuary, the clerics used these 
gatherings of people to mobilize them to their cause. The use of religion for claim 
makings is very common when mobilizing an opinion and it has a real advantage 
when comparing to other organizations concerning the communication. The 
churches and the mosques have their frequent gatherings, such as the Christian 
worship service on Sundays or the Islamic Friday sermon. These gatherings attract 
many people weekly and could use as a place where the priest or the imam can 
state more or less anything and in my specific case to attract an opinion and to 
make a claim. This opportunity gives the religious organizations a great advantage 
since their communication is more eye-to-eye and speaks direct to the people 
which increases the message efficiency (Wald et al 2005: 134f). The clerics 
advantages of communication in Iran were used in a successful manner since the 
people, who eventually began protesting in the streets claimed an Islamic 
Republic which was synchronized to the claims of Khomeini and the clergy had 
stated (Salehi: 147 & Khomeini and Algar: 27-149). 
3.2 Unification 
The identity process is very important when mobilizing the people. This is the part 
of the process when claimant A unites actors B with each other, which paves the 
way of making actors B do things they never had done before and is needed when 
taking further action in the process of claim making (Tilly and Tarrow: 78f). This 
section will highlight this process in the case of Iran and how Ayatollah Khomeini 
acquired a collective identity to his supporters. 
The most significant in the identity process is the boundary formation. This 
involves, as the name predicts, the formation of boundaries in the group and 
creating an us-them distinction (Ibid: 215). To form your identity you most often 
state what you not identify with. An example is the identity formation of a Swede. 
He or she probably identifies themselves with things that Swedes occasionally do, 
that people of other nationalities does not, or at least not in the same extent. It 
could be language, customs or religion that plays the roles of this boundary tool 
which shapes ones identity (Brass 1991: 20f). To thicken these boundaries of a 
group you make clear of what you not are. This not only unifies the group itself 
but also states the criterions of membership of the group and pinpoints the other. 
The pinpointing of the other, who in the case of Iran embodies as the Shah and his 
regime, is a common occurrence in the identification of certain groups or 
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 organizations. Examples of identity formations is found in the case of the 
Zapatistas in Mexico who identified themselves as “the poor people” or “the 
people used as cannon fodder” and used the “dictatorship” and the “Mexican 
federal army” to identify the other as well as the enemy (Tilly and Tarrow: 72f). 
Another example is the Muslims and the Hindus of South Asia, where the two 
parties uses references to each other for not stating who they are (Brass: 75-80). 
Khomeini had three major others that were connected to each other and were 
stated as the enemies in his texts and speeches and had a function of forming the 
boundaries of the supporters of Khomeini. Apart from the Shah and his regime, 
USA and Israel was frequently the targets of critique from Khomeini. The 
pointing at USA as the enemy was rather favorable in Khomeini’s case since USA 
most often embodies the concept of westernization, which the people of Iran felt 
anger to. Khomeini had no fear in often explicitly stating America as the number 
one enemy of Iran and Islam and one clear example is found in a message to 
Pilgrims in Iran and over the world: 
 
“Defend fearlessly and unhesitatingly the peoples and countries of Islam against their 
enemies- America, international Zionism, and all the superpowers of East and West” 
(Khomeini, September 24, 1979, cited in Khomeini and Algar: 276) 
 
Though America was the biggest enemy to Iran and often referred to as the 
“Great Satan” (Salehi: 34), the state of Israel suffered many derogatory statements 
from Khomeini who declared Israel, who were supported by America, Britain and 
Soviet both militarily and politically, as a derivation of America (e.g. Khomeini 
and Algar: 187, 210 & 214). Khomeini and the clergy’s claims were to get rid of 
the Shah but because of the big risks of accusing and criticizing the Shah directly 
they often used his allies USA and Israel as the main targets of the critique. 
Khomeini himself experienced the harshness against Shah-critics after a speech 
where he attacked the Shah and his approval of a law making Americans 
diplomatically immune in Iran. A section from that speech is here cited which 
explicitly calls for an uprising against the Shah though thirteen years before the 
actual overthrow: 
 
“[…] Muslim peoples! Leader of the Muslim peoples! Presidents and kings of the Muslim 
peoples! Come to our aid! Shah of Iran, save yourself!” (Khomeini, October 27, 1964, cited in 
Khomeini and Algar: 185) 
 
This speech caused Khomeini’s forced deportation from Iran to Turkey where 
he continued to attack the regime in Iran but now also commenting on wider 
issues concerning the Muslim world (Bakhash: 35-8). The speech not only aims to 
attack the Shah, America and Israel but to unify the people, the Muslim people. 
Turning to the actual mechanism of Khomeini’s unification, Islam is used as the 
base for the unification of the people. As brought up earlier the identity formation 
is often based on what you not are and referring to the other. It is important to 
locate what differentiates us from them. In the case of the ethnic identity of the 
Dayaks in Kalimantan, their identity was based on a more or less fabricated 
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 history telling (Beik & Strinde 2008: 15). The Muslims and the Hindus of India 
used religion as their base of identity and unification which is the same tool used 
in the case of Iran. The Shah had the ancient monarchy of Persia as the role model 
for his leadership which the clergy and Khomeini opposed. Instead they 
propagated for a leadership based on Islam and their laws and implicitly claiming 
the supporters of the Shah as unbelievers, upholders of an imperialistic world 
order and violators of the commandments of Islam (Khomeini and Algar: 66 & 
Bakhash: 29). These claims not only points out the enemy but also forms the rules 
of membership in the Khomeini supporter group. You should be a believer and 
feel an aggression to the imperialistic world order to feel united with the group of 
people supporting Khomeini and the clergy. Another element frequently used in a 
mobilization process and especially in the identity formation is the use of myths 
and symbolism as unifying instruments the people can relate to (Brass: 62f). 
These myths are, if being harsh to the concept of religion, what the religion is all 
based on. This makes the use of myths and symbolism as a natural part of the 
speeches of Khomeini which he often used when stating Islam and its Imams as 
the legitimate rulers of the Muslim people: 
 
“Whenever a believer dies, the angels weep, together with the ground where he engaged in the 
worship of God and the gates of heaven that he entered by means of his good deeds. A crack 
will appear in the fortress of Islam, that naught can repair, for believers who are fuqaha6 are 
the fortresses of Islam, like the encircling walls that protect a city” (Khomeini refers to a 
quote of Imam Abu ´l-Hasan Musa the son of Ja’far, the seventh of the Twelve Imams. Cited 
in Khomeini and Algar: 73) 
 
Another important event occurs when Khomeini compares Islamic symbolism 
to an event called the faiziyyeh massacre in 1963 when people attending an 
Islamic seminar in the city of Qom were attacked and killed by the police and 
military. In a number of speeches held a couple of months after these killings 
Khomeini draws comparisons to the martyrdom of Husayn and his 72 followers in 
the battle of Karbala to the people being killed at the faiziyyeh seminar (Khomeini 
and Algar: 177). This event together with another similar event called the black 
Friday when over hundreds of people got killed during a peaceful march in 
Tehran (Hussain: 127) is often brought up as time grew closer to the actual 
overthrow of the Shah. The significant strategy of glorifying people the opinion 
can relate to, as in the case of the martyrs in Qom is a well used strategy in the 
process of unifying a people or a group, e.g. in the case of the Dayaks in 
Kalimantan (van Klinken 2007) and is therefore in my opinion important to 
highlight in this case when trying to analyze the events of a mobilization process 
when the claimants unifies its supporters. 
Khomeini used numerous references to the Islamic teachings in his texts and 
speeches both to legitimize the possible advent of an Islamic republic and to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 Fuqaha is the plural term used of people being experts of the Islamic law and is by Khomeini said to be the 
leaders of an Islamic republic (Nationalencyklopedia-fiqh & Khomeini and Algar: 78) 
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 signal what is expected from the supporters to achieve the claims of an Islamic 
republic according to the books of Islam. The use of Islamic symbolism is even 
more used when directly calling the people to rise up against the Shah and is 
analyzed in the following section when the actual exhortation to a revolution is 
reflected and analyzed. 
3.3 Revolution 
This section will give the reader the final puzzle piece in the understanding of 
how Khomeini could mobilize the people to do a revolution. I have focused on the 
speeches when Khomeini more or less explicitly calls for a revolution and analyze 
his rhetoric in terms of Shia Islam which Khomeini frequently refers to when 
gathering his supporters to for a collective action as Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 216) 
labels it.  
When Khomeini was deported in 1963 the Shah hoped the accusing of his 
regime would seize to exist. Unfortunately for him the accusations from Khomeini 
continued but the tone was now fiercer and fearlessly pointed directly to the Shah. 
The tone to the people also changed to a more hortatory tone. Khomeini had at 
this moment of the process already gained a broad support and cleansed the 
possible competitors to his claims such as the Marxists. He had shaped an identity 
of the supporters and stated the enemies. The coming process was to make his 
supporters actually risking their lives for his claims. The mechanism Khomeini 
used for this purpose was Islam and primarily the Shiite tradition and its 
martyrdom. 
The previous section brought up the massacre of faiziyyeh in 1963 and how 
the people who were killed in it became martyrs. The martyrdom is a very 
important part in the Shiite belief. It descends from Imam Husayn and his 
seventy-two companions who in the year of 680 fought a battle in the city of 
Karbala, which commonly is known as the “Karbala paradigm”. Imam Husayn, 
the third Imam after Muhammad is in Shiite tradition seen as the symbol of 
struggle and resistance because of what happened in Karbala (Ram 1994: 61). He 
is often referred to by Khomeini as time draws closer to the revolutionary 
outbreak and one example is found in a speech delivered one year before the 
revolutionary outburst in a mosque in the city of Najaf in Iraq: 
 
“There are people among us who tell us we must swallow whatever poison the “holders of 
authority” wish to force us down our throats, simply because they are the “authorities” […] In 
a certain sense, God gave kingship to the Pharaoh, but did not Moses oppose him? […] And 
then Imam Husayn (peace be upon him) gathered up his family and fifty or sixty followers 
and rose up in revolt against another “holder of authority,” Yazid. Why did he do that?” 
(Khomeini, February 19, 1978, cited in Khomeini and Algar: 225) 
 
The usage of these Qur’anic references was probably very helpful when 
Khomeini called the people to rise against the Shah since he uses references to 
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 events that people can relate to. You can however question the actual occurrence 
of the events, but they are though brought up in the Qur’an which must be seen as 
easier for a Muslim to relate to than anything else. 
Actual callings for the people to rise against the Shah are not hard to find and 
are in 1978-9 stated explicitly without any fear for anything. The speeches from 
these years are very pathos-loaded and the use of Islamic symbolism appeals to 
the audience’s emotions which is favourable in cases such as this one since the 
aim is to convince the audience to act in a certain manner (Bergström & Boréus 
2000: 90). A great example is here used to try to capture Khomeini’s rhetoric 
during the years before the revolution when he calls for an uprising: 
 
“My beloved ones, summon up all your strength and break open the chains of slavery! One 
after the other, remove the treacherous pawns of the Shah from the scene and cut off the 
greedy hands of those that manipulate them and their like in the Islamic countries. The way to 
happiness, freedom, and independence is barred by those pawns and those who manipulate 
them, so scatter their ranks and save the country!” (Khomeini, October 11, 1978, cited in 
Khomeini and Algar: 239) 
 
The actual date when the revolution began is hard to pinpoint because there 
are numerous protests all over the country for a couple of months time that finally 
made the Shah leave Iran for a “temporary” stay abroad (Saikal: 3). Though there 
was a peak of activities all over the country during the holy month of Muharram7 
and especially during the first ten days of the month called the Ashura period 
(Hussain: 111). This period is important for the Shiites since it is a festival that 
commemorates the death of the Imam Husayn, the Imam earlier mentioned as the 
symbol of martyrdom in Shiite tradition. You should not leave aside the fact that 
it was not of coincidence that the people of Iran risked their lives by protesting in 
the streets during the festival of commemorating the death of an Imam who 
according to the Qur’an risked his life when protesting against what he thought 
was wrong. Khomeini had successfully indoctrinated the people of Iran to risk 
their life as the Imam Husayn did to achieve the claims of an Islamic republic. 
The question to be answered in this chapter was how Khomeini succeeded to 
mobilize a broad mass that eventually made a revolution. This chapter has tried to 
highlight three important parts of the mobilization process that makes it easier to 
understand why Khomeini acquired such a broad support and eventually exhort 
these people to risk their own lives by protesting against the Shah and his regime 
and stating claims that in the end lead to giving the political power of the country 
to Khomeini himself.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 Muharram is the first month of the Islamic year (Britannica – Ashura) 
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 4 Conclusion 
The research problems have hopefully been answered to the reader in a 
pleasant manner. The answer to the first question of why the revolution in Iran 
happened was perhaps clear for people with an insight of the case. The dictatorial 
leadership of the Shah, the corrupt system, the economic inequalities, the reform 
program that had negative consequences including the overpopulation of the cities 
and the westernization of the society. All these situations created a frustration of 
the people. A frustration that could escalate to a revolution in any state all over the 
world, but a revolution does not happen automatically. It needs a “triggerer”, a 
person or an organization that sees and feels the frustration of the people. This 
person was Ayatollah Khomeini. The previous chapter has tried to answer the 
second question this study was supposed to answer; how Khomeini succeeded to 
mobilize the people of Iran and eventually made them do a revolution. He gained 
the people’s support with a combination of the popular rhetoric of Marxism and 
traditional Islamic expressions. The Marxist rhetoric was favourable to make the 
people understand their oppressed position and the Islamic expressions including 
its symbolism were used because of its broader catchment-area and because it 
probably was easier for an undereducated person in Iran to relate to that instead of 
a rather unknown ideology. This also extinguished the competition from the 
Marxist groups in Iran that also claimed the resignation of the Shah. Then was 
focus turned to the identity formation of the supporters of Khomeini. The 
formation would well fit in other examples of identity formations including the 
Zapatista movement in Mexico or the Hindus in South Asia. These are all 
examples of identities often stating themselves what they not are, which forms the 
boundary of the group itself when issuing the other. The Shah together with USA 
and Israel was stated as the other in the case of Khomeini. This subsequently 
made the supporters of Khomeini people who did not identify themselves with 
both the leadership of the Shah nor the imperialistic principles USA and its 
offspring Israel stands for. 
As turning to the actual outbreak of the revolution many of Khomeini’s speeches 
used the reference to the Imam Husayn who risked his life in the battle of Karbala 
and become the symbol of martyrdom in the Shiite tradition. This was probably a 
triggering factor to why the people actually went out and protested in the streets 
during the festival of the commemoration of Imam Husayn which subsequently 
made the Shah leave Iran and a new order could establish where Ayatollah 
Khomeini was the leader. 
When reflecting this study, you can not help to ask yourself what this could 
contribute to in a broader spectrum or for further studies. Concerning the first 
research question, the contribution to the discipline of political science could 
possibly be another persuasion that implies that states with authoritarian leaders, a 
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 corrupt system, economical inequalities are more prone to a revolution than other 
states. I also suggest that hard implementations of new cultural influences in a 
country could have the negative effect as it had in the case of Iran. The second 
research question could be used as a guideline of how to unify a broad mass and 
exhort them to do things they probably never would do.  It could furthermore 
work as an example of a successful mobilization campaign all in the concept of 
contentious politics. You could well fit this example together with other 
successful mobilizations such as the mobilization campaign in Serbia before the 
Balkan War or in Kalimantan, Indonesia before the ethnic cleansing of the 
Madurese people in 2001. These mobilization campaigns where issued by a small 
elite to make way for their own interests. If the case of Khomeini and the clergy’s 
campaign had the same purpose do I leave aside, but the fact remains that the 
leader of the mobilization campaign, Ayatollah Khomeini later got the highest 
political and spiritual post in Iran. The use of religion in the campaign was very 
successful and could, because of the outcome of the revolution lead to further 
questions whether Islam was only used for instrumental purposes and that 
Khomeini and the clergy used Islam to attract the people and subsequently called 
them to revolt in the name of the religion so Khomeini and the clergy later could 
be installed to govern. However these questions could be answered in a future 
study. 
 
 
 
 22
 References 
Literature and Articles 
 
 
Abrahamian, Ervand (1993). Khomeinism: essays on the Islamic Republic. 
London: I. B. Tauris  
Bakhash, Shaul (1984). The reign of the ayatollahs: Iran and the islamic 
revolution. New York: Basic Books 
Beik, Saam & Strinde Zacharias (2008). Konsten att tillverka en identitet – En 
studie av orsakerna och mobiliseringen till våldet i centrala Kalimantan 2001. 
Lund: 
Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina (2000). Textens mening och makt: 
metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig textanalys. Lund: Studentlitteratur 
Brass, Paul R. (1991). Ethnicity and nationalism: theory and comparison. New 
Delhi: Sage 
Esaiasson, Peter & Gilljam, Mikael & Oscarsson, Henrik & Wängnerud, Lena 
2005. Metodpraktikan – konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 
Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik AB 
Goldstone, Jack A. (1991). Revolution and rebellion in the early modern world. 
Berkeley: University of California Press 
Hussain, Asaf (1985). Islamic Iran: revolution and counter-revolution. London: 
Pinter 
Khomeini, Ruhollah & Algar, Hamid (1981). Islam and revolution: writings and 
declarations of Imam Khomeini. Berkeley: Mizan P 
Lundquist, Lennart (1993). Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur 
McDaniel, Tim (1991). Autocracy, modernization, and revolution in Russia and 
Iran. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press. 
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